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Abstract
Current political sociology scholarship suggests that limited state autonomy from societal organisations undermines 
state enforcement capacity throughout the national territory, and therefore does superficial separation of the state 
from civil society (or formal from informal institutions) in the conceptualisation of what effective state system ought 
to be. These conceptions contradict realities in post-colonial Africa where societal organisations have evolved to bear 
‘state-like’ qualities in resource governance, especially in remote locations where the state has no promising alter-
native to accommodating inputs from revered institutions or charismatic actors to complement its functions. Colo-
nial experiences in Africa have produced institutional pluralism and a consequential split loyalty to the state in the 
post-independence era. Apparently, limited state autonomy sometimes refract or obstruct state visions; the resultant 
co-governance regime does not imply ‘wishy-washy’ state leadership. This is because state formation processes have 
produced an intermeshed governance of people, places, and resources through a complicated interplay between entities 
which have become indistinct in terms of functions, and hence cannot be simplistically categorised as either formal or 
informal, state or non-state. In this sense, the activity of regulating affairs in the post-colonial regime is characterised 
by relational governance – a form of governance sutured via reciprocal relation(s) between multiple actors across dif-
ferent spatial scales and milieus. Drawing on an empirical study of biofuel projects in Ghana, we believe a relational 
governance approach provides an analytic framework to challenge this orthodoxy in governance studies and refresh 
discussions on the nature of state-society relations required for effective governance of territorial resources in post-
colonial regimes characterised by institutional pluralism. 
Zusammenfassung
Die gegenwärtige Lehrmeinung der politischen Soziologie neigt dazu, eingeschränkte staatliche Autonomie ge-
genüber gesellschaftlichen Gruppen und Organisationen als Unterminierung der Verfügungsmacht des Staates 
über das nationale Territorium zu sehen, weswegen sie meist eine oberflächliche Unterscheidung zwischen Staat 
und Zivilgesellschaft (oder zwischen formellen und informellen Institutionen) vollzieht, wenn sie die Effektivi-
tät von Staatssystemen beurteilt. Diese Vorstellungen stehen in deutlichem Wiederspruch zu den Realitäten in 
afrikanischen Staaten, wo sich gewohnheitsrechtliche Autoritäten und gesellschaftliche Organisationen entwi-
ckelt haben, die ‚staatsähnliche‘ Qualitäten aufweisen, z. B. bei der Verwaltung von natürlichen und territorialen 
Ressourcen in entlegenen Regionen, auf die staatliche Institutionen weit weniger zugreifen können. Mangelnde 
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1. Introduction 
The existence of overlapping ‘formal’ and ‘informal 
institutions’ in crucial decision-making processes in 
Africa is usually considered problematic under the 
assumption that such systems make state power less 
totalising and consolidated. The authority of the state 
to implement its decisions in its territory in many 
post-colonial landscapes have required the consent of 
or cooperation with societal organisations (see Berry 
2011; Lavers and Boamah 2016; Boone 2003, for exam-
ple). The resultant state authority is usually portrayed 
as ‘weak’ or ‘weakened’ (Migdal 1988; Scott 1998; 
Boone 2003, 2007), particularly in post-colonial Afri-
ca where strong customary authorities have evolved 
to bear ‘state-like’ qualities and sometimes consid-
ered ‘rivals’ to the state (Ray 1996; Rathbone 2000; 
Agyeman-Duah 2007). In East Africa, for instance, 
President Milton Obote of Uganda sought to destroy 
the ancient Buganda Kingdom when King Mutesa II 
challenged the authority of ‘modern rule’ through an 
electoral verdict in the post-colonial period; the set-
tler societies in South Africa also uprooted traditional 
governance institutions despite resistance by the 
Zulu ethnic group (Agyeman-Duah 2007). But in West 
Africa, and in Ghana in particular, the chieftaincy in-
stitution has remained in situ to the present day (ibid.) 
against all odds in the early post-independence era 
(Rathboone 2000). Contrary to Western conditions, 
where the state features as the all-powerful entity 
embodying the sole preserve of exercising power over 
the territory and population (Bodin 2014 [1576], Hob-
bes 2010 [1651], Hegel 1977 [1807], Elias 1982 [1939]), 
state formation processes in Africa have produced 
radically different post-colonial conditions which 
continually mediate resource governance in unique 
ways. From the Western perspective of classic state 
theory, the post-colonial conditions smack of ‘weak 
state’ or  fragmented state system (Elias 1982 [1939]), 
lacking the capacities to establish ‘strong’ state situ-
ations like the Ausnahmezustand (“state of exception”, 
see Schmitt 1985 [1922], Cristi 1997).1 We consider it 
rather as a manifestation of the longstanding problem 
of scholars obsessed with over-simplifying, under-
standing and conceptualising African experiences per 
the Western perceptual lens. It also highlights the fact 
that Western conceptions of civil society organisa-
tions and the state (or so-called ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ 
institutions) are not coterminous with the use and ap-
plication of the same concepts in Africa where the dis-
tinction between them has always been blurred due 
to the sutured reciprocal relations between the ‘state’ 
and ‘societal organisations’. 
We do not presuppose the post-colonial African state 
has given up on its legal mandate to render the popu-
lation, territory or resources governable. Rather, the 
population’s reverence for customary authorities be-
fore and during the colonial era, and the ‘charisma’ of 
customary office-holders (chiefs, tribal leaders, fam-
ily heads, and landlords) in peripheral areas were so 
strong that the state could not by-pass or supplant 
Keywords territoriality, Africa, state authority, civil society organisations, human geography, relationality, 
biofuels, Ghana
(territoriale) Reichweite und ‚infrastrukturelle Macht‘ des Staates sind in afrikanischen Nationen dabei eher der 
Normalfall, da in jenen die kolonialen Erfahrungen in der Zeit nach der Unabhängigkeit zu institutionellem Plu-
ralismus und folglich zu einer Art ‚geteilter Loyalität‘ der Bevölkerung zwischen traditionellen, lokal situierten 
Strukturen und dem Staat geführt haben. Tatsächlich werden also räumlich ‚periphere‘ Steuerungsprozesse ge-
sellschaftlich teilweise ‚anerkannten‘ Akteuren überlassen, deren Legitimität auch auf gewohnheitsrechtlichen 
Qualitäten beruht. In diesem Sinne sind postkoloniale Staaten von einer institutionalisierten relationalen Gover-
nance gekennzeichnet, d. h. von wechselseitigen Beziehungen in einer geteilten Souveränität zwischen verschie-
denen Akteuren, und das über räumliche Skalen und soziale Milieus hinweg. Ausgehend von einer empirischen 
Untersuchung zu Investitionsprojekten von Biokraftstoffen in Ghana argumentieren wir, dass der Ansatz der 
Relationalen Governance eine analytische Rahmung darstellt, um oberflächliche formell/informell und staat-
lich/nichtstaatliche Dichotomien in der Theoriebildung zu vermeiden. Damit soll der Weg für eine neue, kriti-
sche Auseinandersetzung mit der spezifischen Art der Kooperation zwischen staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen 
Akteuren und Institutionen ermöglicht werden. Somit kann die spezifische Governance von Territorien und ma-
teriellen Ressourcen im postkolonialen Kontext, die im Falle vieler afrikanischer Länder durch institutionellen 
Pluralismus gekennzeichnet ist, untersucht werden.
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them even after the colonial era (Boamah 2015; Berry 
2001). In Chiefs Know Their Boundaries, Sara Berry 
(2001) shows how chiefs invoke custom to define land 
boundaries to their own advantage without using 
modern maps. Despite usual contradictions in cus-
tomary narratives or ‘traditional evidence’ on land 
ownership (ibid.), the state acknowledges such prac-
tices due to its reverence for the chieftaincy institu-
tion and the charisma of chiefs (Boamah 2015; Lavers 
and Boamah 2016).
 
In Weber’s terms (1968 [1921/22]: 140 f.), charisma 
refers to the “irrational” moments of personal persua-
siveness of talent and gift, which stands against mod-
ern, “rational” forms of leadership backed by a strong 
bureaucracy. The “ideal type” of “rational leadership” 
is oriented towards the inherent, absolute necessity of 
bureaucracies to act in line with rational, formal law 
– in absence of any personal involvement or emotion. 
Modern rule allows actors to gain profits or achieve 
goals (e.g., land rights) regardless of any traditional 
privileges such as belonging to a certain ethnic group 
or a ruling family lineage, and is therefore called “le-
gal rule” (Weber 1968 [1921/22]: 124). In contrast to 
this, charismatic rule gains its legitimacy not from 
‘just’ procedures and lawsuits of interchangeable of-
ficials or state servants acting along general state 
laws, but from the belief in the righteousness of a cer-
tain exceptional, extraordinary form of leadership in 
the hands of somebody, and not anybody (Weber 1968 
[1921/22]: 124, 141 f.). As a result, aspects of charisma 
or tradition play a greater role in societies organised 
in this way, as there is a bigger need in the sense of 
Weber’s concept “legitimacy” to ground it in old rules 
(i.e., traditional law) or in the personality and the ex-
traordinary skills of a certain person (i.e., charismatic 
leadership) than in Western societies characterised 
by a longue durée of strong state history (Weber 1968 
[1921/22]).
But the practices in African contexts also differ from 
the Weberian conception of charisma (ascribed to 
leaders), as these often have an additional element of 
ancestral endorsement (i.e. spirituality) hailing from 
the appropriate lineage/tribe and are accepted by the 
population based on these customs. This makes lead-
ership an embodiment of legitimate representation of 
spiritual and physical needs of the governed subjects. 
From a Weberian viewpoint, this legitimacy can be 
regarded as a mixture of traditional and charismatic 
elements of leadership – and, moreover, within a mod-
ern, post-colonial state setting. This makes it appear 
not as an unmodern, classic form of power regulation 
(as the Weber tradition may have assessed it) but as 
a contemporary welding of existing (and still legiti-
mate) skills applied to the needs of political and ju-
ridical developments of such ‘young’ states. As these 
elements of power regulation occur (and are obvious-
ly effective and needed), they span a field of certain 
power sources of legitimacy. We regard such fields as 
a relational setting of governance (see chapter 3).
Also, as relatively new actors to this field, members 
of civil society organisations/NGOs have gained much 
prominence in their advocacy works on environmen-
tal and development issues (Neubert 1997). Especially 
in peripheral areas, NGOs have consequently gained 
‘expert’ status due to their experiential knowledge in 
natural resource governance. Their actions are re-
garded legitimate and appropriate, because they refer 
to some extra-quotidian skills and attitudes towards 
something higher in moral value than pure power-
play, like ecological and/or social questions. This 
shows how greatly such ties to ‘non-rational’ beliefs 
and truths can structure contemporary fields of pow-
er in these contexts. Hence, we think that the concept 
of relational governance is suited to analysing this not 
as an irrational residuum of failed or incomplete mod-
ernisation, but as a ‘non-resolving remainder of iden-
tity’ produced by the processes of decolonisation and 
modernisation since the 1960s (Zizek 2006).
We treat charisma not as an obstacle to the activity 
of governing; rather, we view it as a productive and 
necessary lubricant of the state indirectly governing 
territorial resources through institutional actors em-
bodying such qualities that the state lacks. The logics 
underpinning such spatially and socially differenti-
ated forms of exercising state authority in governance 
processes in post-colonial political landscapes war-
rant a critical consideration. Territorial reach is a sali-
ent aspect of state capacity, which may also be called 
state infrastructural power in Michael Mann’s terms. 
State infrastructural power refers to “the capacity 
of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to 
implement logistically political decisions throughout 
the realm” (Mann 1984: 113). The state penetrates the 
daily lives of the population more than it did centuries 
ago by way of accessing and storing economic and oth-
er relevant information about the population, thereby 
increasing its infrastructural power immensely (ibid.). 
State formation processes in Africa, nonetheless, have 
given prominence to customary authorities in the ac-
tivity of ‘governing’ peripheral resources and succes-
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sor post-colonial democratic states have created addi-
tional governing spaces for customary authorities and 
civil society organisations/NGOs. Despite structural 
interdependencies in governance processes, the role 
of the post-colonial state and ‘non-state’ institutional 
actors are often treated as conflicting rather than op-
erating in concert (Mbembe 2000). 
These framings beg crucial questions but unanswered 
in resource governance literature: 
1. What were the pre-colonial and post-independ-
ence conditions of these African states?
2. Which aspects of sovereign qualities have African 
states ceded to or shared with ‘societal organisa-
tions’ over the years? 
3. How can governance scholars methodologically 
distinguish the post-colonial state from ‘societal 
organisations’ and what is the validity of knowl-
edge regimes underpinning those processes? 
Since the tasks we have set for ourselves may lead 
readers to rethink their choice of governance con-
cepts and prompt emancipatory knowledge produc-
tion processes, our ambition may be misconstrued as 
an attempt to refresh post-colonial and decoloniality 
debates (see Mignolo 2007; Quijano 2000, for exam-
ple). This is not our ambition in this article. Rather, 
we intend to examine the quality and limitations of 
the state’s relations with so-called ‘non-state actors’ 
(or societal organisations) in governance processes 
in post-colonial landscapes. We are, therefore, not 
merely interested in analysing relations but rather 
the nature and quality of those relations, suited to 
addressing evolving governance challenges in post-
colonial Africa. Drawing on an empirical study of 
biofuel projects in Ghana, we believe a relational gov-
ernance approach provides an analytic framework to 
challenge this orthodoxy in governance studies and 
refresh discussions on the nature of state-society re-
lations required for effective governance of territorial 
resources in post-colonial settings characterised by 
institutional pluralism.
The first section presents mainstream debates about 
the implications of the state’s relations with societal 
organisations in governance processes. This is fol-
lowed by the introduction of the ‘relational govern-
ance’ concept. The next section presents jatropha 
biofuel investment projects as examples of territorial 
resources, and the consequences of the state’s rela-
tions with ‘non-state’ actors in biofuel governance in 
Ghana. This penultimate section is followed by con-
ceptual reflections and ends with our contribution to 
governance studies.
2. Localizing the problem
How effective the post-colonial state renders politi-
cal problems, territories and population governable 
in contexts of ‘institutional pluralism’ (see Ubink and 
Pickering 2020) is least analysed in ‘governmentality 
studies’ in non-Western contexts such as Africa, where 
charismatic qualities and spiritual roles of customary 
actors provide an important inspiration, especially for 
the population, in comparison to formal institutional 
actors (presidents, ministers of state, government 
appointees, etc.). The writings of Donald Ray (1996) 
and Christian Lund (2011) provide striking examples 
of this gap and their stance on legitimacy, sovereignty 
and state are worth revisiting. In Divided Sovereignty, 
Ray (1996) argues that customary authorities exer-
cise powers that run parallel to that of the Ghanaian 
post-colonial state since chiefs depend on a certain le-
gitimacy and authority that predate the colonial era. 
The contemporary Ghanaian state is, however, a crea-
tion of or successor to the colonial state that justifies 
its authority and legitimacy on classical Western the-
ories and practices of the state. These divergent roots 
of legitimacy and authority have created what Donald 
Ray (1996) calls ‘divided sovereignty’. Ray draws on 
the works of Frederick Watkins (1968) and Preston 
King (1987) with reference to state-chieftaincy inter-
relations. Ray cites Watkins’ definition of the state as 
‘a territory in which a single authority exercises both 
de jure and de facto’ sovereign powers and relates this 
to King’s definition of sovereignty: “power or author-
ity which comprises the attributes of an ultimate ar-
bitral agent (...) entitled to make decisions and settle 
disputes within a political hierarchy with some degree 
of finality” (King cited in Ray 1996: 182; emphasis in 
original). Ray takes on King’s claim that a sovereign 
decision is final in the specific sense that no inferior 
(subordinate) agent within the hierarchy can (or is en-
titled to) reverse it (cited in Ray 1996: 183). Ray ques-
tions such claims by referring to the 1979 and 1992 
constitutions of Ghana that treat chiefs as no inferior 
to state institutions, not even to the parliament. The 
1992 Constitution of Ghana sets up the Council of State 
as an advisory body to the president and includes the 
National House of Chiefs (i.e., a representative body 
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of chiefs) and bars governmental interference in the 
functioning of the chieftaincy institution (see in gen-
eral von Trotha 1996; Capps 2016).2
 
For Ray, King assumes a common source of sovereign-
ty and legitimacy for all entities within a polity, which 
is problematic in contexts of institutional pluralism. 
Ghanaian chiefs have always justified their unques-
tionable authority in land governance by referring to 
significant precedents that exalt heroic acts of their 
forebears who conquered territories, including plac-
es they currently reside in (Berry 2001; Lund 2008; 
Boamah 2014). Chiefs often invoke custom to decide on 
social groups who have rightful land entitlements and 
those who do not, and Ghana’s 1992 Constitution re-
quires law courts to apply customary laws to address 
land litigations (see Berry 2001). Per Ray’s definition 
of sovereignty as “the ability (i.e., power) and the right 
(i.e., legitimacy) to make final determination (…) in a 
state/polity” (Ray 1996: 187), chiefs bear near ‘sover-
eign’ or ‘state-like’ qualities in Ghana. Ray, therefore, 
predominantly highlights tensions between the post-
colonial state and chieftaincy institutions: 
 
(…) because chieftaincy is traditional authority 
and is exercised in an overtly public and political 
arena, the state constantly finds itself in continu-
ing contact, competition or cooperation with tra-
ditional authority over a variety of policy issues. 
In turn these reflect a division of authority, pow-
er, legitimacy and sovereignty (Ray 1996: 185).
 
Indeed, Ray does not deny possible cooperation in 
this circumstance of divided sovereignty yet consid-
ers the entire system problematic on the premise that 
the state is challenged by traditional authority. This 
stance is no different from Lund’s Fragmented Sover-
eignty (2011). For Lund, governance is not the sole pre-
serve of governments in post-colonial political land-
scapes but there rather exist numerous institutional 
actors engaged in governance processes “often using 
the language and idioms of state” (Lund 2011: 887). 
He further argues that in contexts “when an institu-
tional actor is able to define and enforce collectively 
binding decisions on members of society, it has state 
quality, or sovereignty” (ibid.: 887). Per Lund’s argu-
ment, state sovereignty can be potentially under-
mined in contexts where the state shares its decision-
making powers with customary authorities.
In Ghana, customary institutions continue to be an 
integral part of the state apparatus itself, and hence 
supplanting or suppressing them would amount to 
undermining the authority of the state, especially in 
peripheral areas where the population have stronger 
attachment to chiefs due to their unique charismatic 
qualities strengthened by spirituality. Ghana has 226 
district, municipal and metropolitan assemblies re-
sponsible for the governance of natural resources, the 
territory and population at the local levels on behalf 
of the state. Within these decentralized government 
structures, there are numerous and scattered settle-
ments which are usually out of touch with the state in 
terms of influence or service delivery. In each settle-
ment in Ghana, nonetheless, there are customary au-
thorities whose existence pre-date even the colonial 
era. These serve as mediators in the affairs of the liv-
ing and their ancestors, and hold land in trust for and 
on behalf of the people as enshrined in the 1992 Con-
stitution of Ghana. The population is, therefore, more 
accustomed to customary authorities than state insti-
tutions, especially on matters regarding entitlement 
to natural resources (land, forests, minerals, etc.) in 
peripheral areas. State institutions and institutional 
actors have relied on the counsel of chiefs in the mak-
ing of crucial political decisions. This is the genesis of 
the split loyalty of the population between the state 
and customary authorities. The spiritual role of cus-
tomary authorities grants them a certain charisma – a 
quality that the state lacks in the activity of governing 
in this social field. Therefore, the post-colonial state 
has no alternative to utilising the charismatic quali-
ties of chiefs to govern the population, especially the 
peripheral areas compared to urban locations. As 
subsequent sections show, such governance cannot 
be explained by standards in secular Western milieus 
where the charisma to govern is devoid of spirituality, 
and the resources in the periphery are governed by 
the same state institutions as elsewhere in the nation-
al territory. Thus, it must be explained via a relational 
concept of governing such diverse state powers.
3. Framing relational governance
Although the concept of governance is not unique and 
offers a wide range of ways in which the exercise of 
power can be conceptualised, it is a fact that govern-
ance approaches are used to refer to a new or changing 
way of governing societies (or groups within society; 
early: Stoker 2002; Benz et al. 2007). Thus, governing 
does not only take place through authoritative regula-
tion by a hierarchical state, but also through “inter-
action and negotiation processes by the actors of the 
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political-administrative system with economic stake-
holders, associations and civil society” (Pfeilschifter 
et al. 2020: 12 ff.). Governance can thus be described 
as a change from a hierarchical, bureaucratic and cen-
tralised authority to a self-governing, horizontal and/
or market-based form of regulation (Shamir 2008; 
Dardot and Laval 2013). To understand governance 
conceptually, it is crucial to reconstruct the actors in-
volved in it. To this end, governance can be defined as 
arising out of a complex set of interactions between 
semi-autonomous economic, social and political ac-
tors who have different roles and interests (Sørensen 
and Torfing 2007: 8; Hewitt de Alcantara 1998: 105). 
It can be considered a political process, practice and 
structure that is concerned with creating the con-
ditions for collective action (Stoker 2002; Kooiman 
2003). Furthermore, governance can be regarded 
as an analytical concept which “involves looking at 
context-specific, historically contingent and funda-
mentally political processes of the establishment, the 
operation, the negotiation and contestation of social 
institutions and how these are constantly ‘brought to 
life’ through social practices” (Etzold 2013: 38).
In addition – or even in contrast – to mainstream con-
cepts of governance, in contemporary anthropologi-
cal studies on African state formations, the notion of 
heterarchy has gained some importance to describe 
the specificity of state and non-state actors under 
limited and fragmented state-hood. Crumley (1995: 3) 
defines heterarchy as “the relation of elements to one 
another when they are unranked or when they pos-
sess the potential for being ranked in a number of dif-
ferent ways”. Heterarchy can further be described as 
a system of elements that is not constituted in a sub- 
and supra-ordinate relationship but co-exist more or 
less equally side by side (Hüsken 2013). Heterarchy 
stands for self-organisation and self-determination 
and emphasises decentralised and bottom-up de-
cisions (Stephenson 2009). However, it needs to be 
pointed out that the establishment of heterarchi-
cal arrangements does not lead to the dissolution of 
hierarchy (White 1995). Taking these newer discus-
sions on changing state power in recent post-colonial 
contexts seriously leads to the assumption that state 
formations in Africa can, therefore, not be considered 
as centres of exclusive hierarchical political decision-
making, but rather as a decentralised network of public 
and private collective actors governing in the sense of 
a heterarchy. Decisions made between public govern-
ment entities and relatively autonomous social or-
ganisations or local stakeholders result in a loosely 
coupled configuration of cooperation that at least 
partly replaces the hierarchical unity of the state and 
forces it to give space for heterarchical structures. He- 
terarchy, therefore, refers to a central category of con-
temporary political (state and non-state) orders: their 
mutual, and at the same time unstable interdepend-
ence, as well as to a large number of competing power 
groups (see Klute 2013). 
Nevertheless, based on these conceptional entry 
points of governance and heterarchy, we do not think 
that the situation is sufficiently theorised yet, as both 
do result out of a changed view on social structures 
and processes, but lack an understanding of the deci-
sive shift in societal interactions and networks of pow-
er relations between (new and old) legitimate groups 
and/or their stakeholders. As the concept of heterar-
chy, nonetheless, focuses on elements/entities in so-
ciety with regards to asymmetrical power relations, 
it, therefore, foregrounds dissonance between actors 
and institutions rather than any existential synergies 
– it simply calls for a different operation or dissemina-
tion of power.3 
Though concepts of governance primarily indicate a 
diminished or diffusing power situation (in contrast 
to top-down government policies), they also shift the 
focus on changed structures which new actors can 
now ‘fill’ with their agencies. But still these studies 
name actors and fields of shifted structures of power 
but lack to clarify – analytically – the new qualities 
of these fields. We think that these new qualities or 
characteristics and interdependencies are best de-
scribed as shifted power relations between stakehol-
ders. That is why we want to argue for a new approach 
which reflects the relational governance of structures 
and actors as being constitutive for their functioning. 
We want to focus on the relationality between these 
‘elements’ in the field between state and (civil) society 
actors to explain the relevance and limits of state and 
societal organisations in governance processes. 
The relational perspective in thinking and theorizing 
about social conditions got an important strand in 
contemporary social theory (Emirbayer 1997; Donati 
2010, 2015). Although not generally a new thought, 
the specific argument on relationality can be consid-
ered as a new way of theorizing social (and institu-
tional) interactions as relations. Its basic rejection of 
concepts that consider social things, groups and plac-
es as entities with sole qualities can be considered as 
its common epistemic ground. Relational theory tries 
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to move beyond classical dualisms such as objectiv-
ism/subjectivism, nature/culture, mind/body, social 
structures/agency or individual/society. Emirbayer 
(1997: 287) argued in the same line that “relational 
theorists reject the notion that one can posit discrete, 
pre-given units such as the individual or society as ul-
timate starting points of sociological analysis”. This 
thinking has, thus, amounted to a “quiet revolution 
in social science, turning from units to context, from 
attributes to connections, from causes to events, and, 
one might add, from substances to networks, from 
essences to relations” (Abbott 1995: 93). To generate 
relational mechanisms for social action, one should 
take “the basic units of social analysis to be neither 
individual entities (agent, actor, person, firm) nor 
structural wholes (society, order, social structure) but 
the relational processes of interaction between and 
among identities” (Tilly 2005: 14). In other words, so-
ciety is not a social space containing of relations, or an 
arena where relations are played: it is rather the very 
tissue of relations. In Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1992: 
232) words “the real is the relational.” 
Especially our case study is an excellent example to 
apply such considerations to concrete and material 
life-worlds, as it allows analysing shifted power re-
lations in the post-colonial era of a Western African 
state. Since about 80% of land areas in peripheral 
Ghana were under the custody of chiefs and other cus-
tomary authorities, the development of large-scale ja-
tropha plantations for biofuels created a new form of 
resource governance where the state, chiefs, biofuel 
investors and NGOs/civil society organisations were 
compelled to relate to each other and to co-govern 
the emerging biofuel industry. A relational approach 
to governance helps examine post-colonial conditions 
and the exercise of state authority. 
4. Choice of case selection – biofuel investment 
projects in Ghana
The paper is primarily based on a case from Ghana 
with a particular focus on jatropha biofuel invest-
ments. Evidence presented in this paper is based on 
long-term, follow-up empirical studies on jatropha 
biofuel investment projects in the southern, central 
and northern parts of Ghana from June 2009 until 
early 2013. The doctoral study was framed within a 
political ecology approach to understand how power 
and politics shape the access to and the use of land 
and other natural resources in the project communi-
ties (see Boamah 2015). Qualitative interviews and 
participatory observations on household level were 
conducted to understand the extent of livelihood im-
pacts of the biofuel investments in the project com-
munities. Interviews and key informant interviews 
were also conducted to examine struggles that en-
sued between chiefs, local farmers, state institutions 
and NGOs/community-based activist organisations 
before and during land allocations to biofuel investors 
for biofuel investments. A review of archival records, 
narratives of custom mediating entitlement to land 
resources, authority of chiefs in allocations and other 
published documents provided important contextual 
information for the analysis of land tenure system, lo-
cal land politics and motivations of different interest 
groups who were involved in the project. The conclu-
sions reached are also based on a review of biofuel 
land grabbing literature and land politics in Ghana. 
The state intended to promote jatropha biofuel invest-
ments to create development opportunities in degrad-
ed land areas in the periphery and generate avenues 
for the utilisation of renewable energy technologies 
in Ghana (Boamah 2015; Ghana Energy Commission 
2011). The biofuel euphoria increased activism by the 
media, NGOs and other civil society organisations. 
As a new ‘territorial resource’ connected to differ-
ent political interests, jatropha biofuel development 
has spatio-political connotations and involves cross-
scalar governance. Furthermore, the chieftaincy in-
stitution in Ghana is more resilient compared to other 
African countries. This makes chiefs, and other tradi-
tional political office-holders powerful in the govern-
ance of peripheral areas where biofuel plantations 
were located.4 NGOs and activist groups serving as 
the ‘mouthpiece’ of marginalised farmers and other 
natural resource users became major channels of in-
formation to the state. Ghana, therefore, offers a clas-
sic case for the analysis of ‘relational governance’ of 
resources in post-colonial political settings. 
5. Do ‘non-state actors’ undermine or enhance 
state enforcement capacity?
The understanding of interdependencies of the state 
and societal organisations in resource governance 
in post-colonial regimes is a well-established topic 
(Ubink and Amanor 2008; Berry 2001, Lund 2008). 
However, the quality and consequences of relations 
between the state and societal organisations are still 
inadequately discussed, especially in Africa where the 
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distinction between them is so blurred in practice. 
Also, the literature seldom shows whether or not the 
prominence of societal institutions undermines state 
authority in governance processes. State formation 
processes and lands reform in Ghana are used here to 
illustrate this.
 
Land reform initiatives in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) 
particularly during the colonial period (1850‒1957) 
and early post-independence regimes (1957‒1980s) 
were intended to increase and consolidate state con-
trol over land through compulsory land acquisitions 
(Larbi et al. 2004; Kasanga 2002). Compulsory land 
acquisitions were meant for the implementation of 
projects that would serve collective good. British 
colonial administration undertook various land ac-
quisitions in the then Gold Coast. In the northern 
protectorate (i.e. northern parts of Ghana), land was 
appropriated without compensation payments and the 
colonial state effectively controlled land in those areas 
(Kasanga 2002; Larbi et al. 2004). In contrast, chiefs 
and educated elites in the colony and the Ashanti (i.e. 
covering a large part of southern of Ghana) success-
fully resisted the Crown Land Bills of the 1890s, bills 
which sought to vest in the British Crown so-called 
unused land areas (Larbi et al. 2004). Fierce opposi-
tion to the Crown Land Bills and the British’s swift 
adoption of the indirect rule system of administration 
was based on fears of incurring the wrath of the lo-
cal population (Fold and Whitfield 2012) who revered 
their ‘natural rulers’ (Berry 2013). The role of chiefs 
as surrogates of British colonial authorities gave the 
chieftaincy institution great prominence, particularly 
in southern Ghana (Boamah 2015). Had it not been the 
successful opposition, the proposed style of resource 
governance by the colonial administration could have 
been conceived of as a grand project of imposing a 
Western understanding of what a proper state author-
ity ought to be in a non-Western political landscape. 
 
After independence, the Convention People’s Party 
(CPP) government (1957‒1966), introduced reforms 
to subject chiefs to strict governmental control. The 
project of the CPP was to break the British legacy that 
made chieftaincy essentially a state institution and 
compel chiefs to cede their longstanding authority to 
the post-colonial state (Rathboone 2000). Stool land5 
revenues were largely collected by the government, 
thereby undermining the finances of chiefs (Busia 
1951) contrary to the standard practice in the preced-
ing years. These land reforms, nonetheless, registered 
limited success, especially in southern Ghana due to 
the resilience of the chieftaincy institution. After the 
overthrow of the CPP government in 1966, successor 
governments restored state-confiscated land to chiefs 
and other customary landowners, and they learnt to 
avoid hostility towards customary authorities (Brem-
pong 2007) to gain the support of chiefs and their sub-
jects. After the return to constitutional democracy in 
1992, various governments again sought to involve 
chiefs in natural resource governance and party poli-
tics (Berry 2013; Boamah 2015). These precedents 
have made the chieftaincy institution even more re-
silient, and chiefs played instrumental roles in land 
administration policies of the state. Ghanaian govern-
ment recently rolled out the Land Administration Pro-
ject (LAP) to encourage foreign investments in Ghana 
and enhance tenure security for small-scale farmers 
(Ubink and Amanor 2008). Under the LAP, control 
over land management, registration and dispute set-
tlement is officially vested into Customary Land Sec-
retariats (CLS) headed by the respective customary 
authorities throughout Ghana. The CLS is required to 
work in close collaboration with state agencies and 
to serve as intermediaries between landowners and 
state agencies. Land boundaries of traditional areas 
and individual land rights within the traditional ar-
eas must be mapped and registered at the office of the 
Regional Lands Commission, thereby increasing ten-
ure security for local landholders (Ubink and Amanor 
2008). Land transfer negotiations should be con-
firmed by CLS before formal registration by the Lands 
Commission. Consequently, land rights formalisation 
processes still depended on narratives and custom 
administered by chiefs.
6. The background of biofuel investment pro-
jects in Ghana
The Ghanaian government between 2003 and 2006 
supported jatropha biofuel initiatives on so-called 
degraded land areas to reduce Ghana’s high oil im-
port bills and create employment opportunities. To 
avoid potential competition between jatropha and 
food crop cultivation, the government selected 53 
districts covering vast areas categorised as ‘degraded 
land’ with the intention to such land areas produc-
tive again. The programme required the participation 
of all District Chief Executives (DCE) and Municipal 
Chief Executives (MCE) and Ghana’s Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (Amoah 2006). District and Munici-
pal Chief Executives are state institutional actors re-
sponsible for the administration and development at 
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the local levels on behalf of the state. However, after 
Ghana’s discovery of oil and gas in 2007, the death of 
the Ghanaian biochemist leading the jatropha biofu-
el initiative, the government’s retreat from jatropha 
biofuel promotion, left the burgeoning biofuel indus-
try to be dominated by chiefs, private investors and 
NGOs. According to Schoneveld et al. (2010), 13 out of 
a total of 17 biofuel investments in Ghana centred on 
jatropha cultivation by August 2009. These investors 
came from Norway, Italy, Canada and other foreign 
countries and land allocations were made by chiefs 
often without prior formal approval from Ghana’s 
Lands Commission. The original idea to promote jat-
ropha cultivation on marginal land continued but no 
formal demarcation of so-called ‘degraded’ land areas 
had been carried out in the 53 selected districts by the 
state. There were also no comprehensive guidelines 
for biofuel land deals. Meanwhile, 17 biofuel compa-
nies collectively acquired land areas of 1,075,000 hec-
tares of which 730,000 hectares were located in the 
forested ecological zones noted for intensive food crop 
production in Ghana (Schoneveld et al. 2010). Despite 
the location of jatropha plantations in peripheral ar-
eas where customary authorities are very prominent 
and where activism by civil society organisations are 
most effective, the state did not fashion out creative 
ways of relating to these ‘non-state’ institutions for ef-
fective governance of biofuel investment projects.
 
These circumstances gave chiefs the leeway to gov-
ern jatropha biofuel projects by re-inventing custom 
and subscribing to wasteland narratives and climate 
change discourses to justify land allocations for jat-
ropha cultivation. Ghanaian chiefs’ strategic use of 
‘marginal land’ and ‘pro-poor’ narratives of jatropha 
to justify land allocations for jatropha plantations in 
rather productive land areas meant that the spatial 
distribution of jatropha investments was determined 
by the interests of chiefs and investors rather than 
the priorities of the state (Lavers and Boamah 2016). 
A simple and obvious conclusion could, therefore, be 
reached: that is, authority of the state to govern biofu-
els is undermined by chiefs and other non-state actors 
(ibid.). A closer reading however shows that post-colo-
nial conditions leave the state with no better alterna-
tives to cultivating a certain form of relationship with 
chiefs and advocacy groups. A couple of examples be-
low illustrate this.
 
Almost all large-scale land allocations by chiefs have 
involved corruption or the blatant defiance of land 
registration processes (Boamah and Williams 2017). 
Consequently, the government introduced new guide-
lines for land allocations above 400 hectares (Ghana 
Lands Commission 2008; Ghana Lands Commission 
2012). The new regulations challenged the compe-
tence of chiefs to negotiate and approve such large 
land deals almost single-handedly. Since the introduc-
tion of the new regulations, land allocations exceeding 
400 hectares required approval by the National Lands 
Commission instead of the Regional Lands Commis-
sion as was the case previously. The government 
further sought to centralise authority by ensuring a 
more active involvement of many relevant state agen-
cies in the assessment of large-scale land allocations. 
The new land regulations and earlier land reform 
initiatives in Ghana have, however, often conflicted 
with rules that empower customary authorities as 
custodians of stool land. Per the Lands Commission Act 
767, documented consent between chiefs or custom-
ary landowners and prospective land investors is a 
prerequisite for large-scale land allocations. Once the 
documented consent is submitted to the office of the 
Lands Commission, subsequent procedures in the for-
malisation of the land deal become a mere formality 
(Boamah 2015). Curtailing the power of chiefs under 
the assumption of strengthening state authority be-
comes even more problematic in the governance of 
territorial resources. Subsequent sections shed light 
on specific jatropha biofuel projects in Ghana.
6.1 The Kimminic Jatropha Project in the central 
part of Ghana
Kimminic Jatropha project involved a joint venture 
land deal of 13,000 hectares (of 65,000 hectares) 
between a biofuel investor Kimminic Estates Ltd 
(henceforth called Kimminic) and a project village in 
the Nkoranza Traditional Council (NTC) in the Brong 
Ahafo region of Ghana. The project was funded by Ca-
nadian investors and Ghanaians living in Canada. The 
contribution of the project community took the form 
of providing access to land areas for the jatropha cul-
tivation, though the investor company was required 
to make compensation payments or provide new land 
areas to the ‘local citizens’ or ‘indigenes’ whose farm-
land areas would be affected. A profit-sharing deal 
of 75% for Kimminic and 25% for the NTC was also 
agreed. Having scrutinised the land deal and regis-
tered the consent of the NTC and Kimminic, Ghana’s 
Lands Commission approved the joint venture in July 
2008. As a joint venture, both the Ghanaian investors 
and NTC agreed that certain areas within the plan-
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tation should be reserved for use by the indigenous 
population. Kimminic collaborated with the NTC by 
adopting both mechanised and labour-intensive pro-
duction methods to create employment mainly for 
those considered ‘local citizens’ compared to those 
considered ‘migrants’. The main rationale for draw-
ing these social distinctions was the motivation to en-
sure that the project would benefit groups who trace 
their descent to the project village or groups who duly 
acknowledged the authority of the chieftaincy insti-
tution (Boamah 2014; Boamah and Overå 2016). Af-
fected migrant farmers and charcoal producers who 
regularly paid tributes or bribed village chiefs gained 
access to new land. Migrants who had established en-
during networks with chiefs, family heads, etc. ben-
efited substantially from the biofuel project in terms 
of employment and access to the project land.  
 
6.2 The ScanFuel Jatropha Project in southern Ghana
Agogo Traditional Council (ATC) in the Ashanti region 
leased an area of 13,000 hectares to a Norwegian bio-
fuel company (ScanFuel Ltd) in 2009 for a period of 
50 years for jatropha cultivation (Boamah 2014). The 
paramount chief who negotiated the land allocation 
claimed the leased land was ‘marginal land’ and thus 
suitable for the cultivation of jatropha as envisioned 
by the Ghanaian government (ibid.). Also, the chief 
claimed the primary motivation for the lease agree-
ment was to generate employment for the indigenous 
population and evict ‘labour migrants’ who have the 
penchant for evading agricultural tributes to the of-
fice of the traditional council. In 2010, the company 
changed from jatropha cultivation to maize produc-
tion on grounds of poor jatropha yields. The switch 
from jatropha cultivation to maize production meant 
a shift towards the use of productive farmlands even 
though a ‘marginal land narrative’ was still used to 
justify the implementation of the new agricultural 
investment. Affected residents were to be paid GHS 
15 per acre per year in cases of land dispossession 
but most village residents were oblivious to these 
arrangements. Since no formal boundaries existed 
between stool land, family and private land areas, 
the project implementation caused massive land dis-
possession. In its report entitled “Norwegian Land 
Grabbers in Ghana” (Bull 2010), a Norwegian NGO 
reported exploitative land deals of the investor com-
pany and questioned the capacity of the Ghanaian 
state to scrutinise agricultural investments. The re-
port dominated media headlines in Ghana stirring up 
‘land grabbing’ debates. A community-based activist 
organisation and Action Aid-Ghana provided updates 
about the project through sensitisation workshops 
and public demonstrations (Action Aid-Ghana 2010, 
2011). After a series of unsuccessful complaints to 
chiefs, the activist organisation sensitised the pub-
lic and state agencies about the biofuel land deal. In 
January 2011, these reservations raised a furore over 
the role of rapacious chiefs in ‘land grabbing and cul-
minated in the renegotiation of the terms of the land 
deal. The tenure of the lease was revised from 50 to 
15 years and initial compensation payment of GHS 15 
per acre for affected farmers was increased to GHS 30. 
The allegedly affected residents were empowered to 
negotiate directly with ScanFarm to decide compen-
sation terms without having to involve chiefs. Two 
problems, nonetheless, ensued after the interventions 
by the MCE and the Ghana Lands Commission (see Bo-
amah 2014).
 
First, physical features used by local farmers to mark 
their farmland boundaries had been removed during 
the land preparation stages of the project implemen-
tation, and so residents had to rely on farming nar-
ratives and settlement history to determine the exact 
locations and sizes of affected land areas for compen-
sation payments (ibid.). Second, the call for renegotia-
tion of the lease created contestations as many resi-
dents made conflicting claims to farmlands to gain 
access to larger areas of land. The new regulations by 
the Lands Commission further complicated matters, 
as it increased bureaucracy in the processing of the 
lease agreement meanwhile the company had already 
made undisclosed payments to chiefs as their ‘cus-
tomary landlords’. ScanFarm in return rejected many 
belated land claims pending the approval of the lease 
agreement by the National Lands Commission. Apart 
from individuals who successfully utilised their strong 
networks to access new land, the project resulted in 
land dispossession for most residents, not excluding 
the indigenous population. Furthermore, despite nu-
merous court rulings, directions from the Lands Com-
mission, NGO advocacy and public complaints against 
the land deal, the paramount chief (who doubles as a 
lawyer and seasoned politician) managed to fend-off 
public criticism by defying court orders, and by invok-
ing custom to justify the land allocations. Even after 
the company realised lack of transparency on the part 
of the chiefs, it was still reticent about the role of the 
NTC in the land deal because of the state’s recognition 
of chiefs as custodians of stool land in Ghana. Migrant 
farmers who regularly paid bribes to chiefs were least 
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affected. Cordial relationships with chiefs and other 
customary authorities became an important require-
ment for securing land use – even in some cases more 
compelling than providing any sort of land title deed. 
6.3 Biofuel Africa Jatropha Project in northern 
Ghana
Biofuel Africa Ltd, an affiliate of the Norwegian com-
pany, Solar Harvest AS gained a permit from Ghana’s 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a 23,000 
hectare-land area for jatropha biofuel investment 
projects in northern Ghana. The EPA Permit covered 
land areas in the Yendi and Central Gonja districts in 
northern Ghana but formalisation of the process had 
be done at the office of the Lands Commission. The 
company depended on ‘oral approval’ by chiefs and 
commenced the project implementation pending of-
ficial registration by the Lands Commission. After a 
few months of land preparation in the Central Gonja 
District, a Ghanaian NGO (Regional Advisory and In-
formation Network Systems) mounted spirited oppo-
sition to the project through media publications. The 
NGO advocacy caught the attention of the state insti-
tution, Ghana’s EPA and the project was consequently 
suspended (Boamah 2011). The main jatropha plan-
tation was implemented in the Yendi district in 2008 
where 10,696 of the 23,000 hectares land area was of-
ficially approved by the Lands Commission. Learning 
from an earlier opposition by civil society organisa-
tions and heeding the advice of chiefs, the company 
decided to ensure food production in the project area, 
protect valuable trees in the leased land area and em-
ploy many local farmers who lost their farmlands to 
the project. When the company relocated to a new site 
after securing EPA permit, NGO activism continued to 
serve as ‘watch-dogs’ on the activities of the compa-
ny (Action Aid-Ghana 2009). Interviews with Ghana’s 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Energy Com-
mission in 2009 confirmed that the government relies 
on civil society organizations for updates on jatropha 
plantations in peripheral areas where government/
state institutions are less effective (Boamah, 2011). 
 
The illustrations above can be distilled into at least 
three central questions: 
1. Why should the institution of chieftaincy contin-
ue to hold such great sway in the governance of 
a country that boasts of being the first independ-
ent state in sub-Saharan Africa and that has since 
been considered the most celebrated democratic 
state in Africa? 
2. Do charisma and spirituality in governance have a 
place in theorising state authority in the West as 
they do in Africa? 
3. Would traditional authorities and civil society or-
ganisations have had such great influence in the 
governance of jatropha biofuels if the jatropha 
plantations were located in the heart of the ur-
ban centres of Ghana where state institutions are 
more effective relative to customary institutions? 
The overarching message communicated here is that 
rather than conceiving state authority as ‘fragment/
divided’, we see it as really consolidated through due 
recognition for customary authorities, civil society or-
ganisations and other institutional actors who wield 
‘sovereign’ qualities over particular territorial re-
sources or have a certain expertise in the gover-nance 
of resources in the periphery which the post-colonial 
state lacks. And if the ‘non-state’ actors accept ope-
rating as responsible surrogates of the state, and in 
turn, give due recognition to the state, the authority of 
the state becomes even more consolidated indirectly 
through such mutual and reciprocal interrelations.
 
The aforementioned description of jatropha biofuel 
plantations is a typical example of a relational gov-
ernance involving the state, customary authorities 
and other societal organisations/NGOs as it is based 
on a material territoriality in rural areas where tra-
ditionally chiefs govern access, usage and distribution 
of resources (e.g., land, water, grazing). We chose this 
empirical example as it shows that a relational gover-
nance practice in post-colonial Ghana is not ‘at stake’ 
per se, since it is more a selective ‘way of governing 
practice’ when material and territorial resources are 
‘at play’.
7. Conclusion – what makes relational govern-
ance work as an analytic framework?
Decentralisation of natural resource governance in 
the periphery has relieved the state of insurmounta-
ble burdens. Chiefs, on the other hand, have enhanced 
(and regained) some of their authority and interests 
by playing the role of ‘state surrogates’ in the periph-
ery. International investors and donor organisations 
have sought to deal directly with chiefs first, before 
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proceeding to the office of state institutions in natural 
resource extraction, and the interests of chiefs have 
often prevailed over those of the state. Also, civil so-
ciety organisations have also – through diverse forms 
of activism – gained a certain degree of prominence 
and competence, and prompted the state to regulate 
biofuel projects in specific ways or biofuel investors 
to act in particular ways. This draws attention to a 
necessary retreat of the post-colonial state towards 
the recognition of the powers of customary institu-
tions and investors, NGOs and media in governance 
processes through diverse interrelations. The charis-
ma of chiefs has provided props for the state to render 
particular issues that lie beyond its governable reach. 
These developments show how ingrained the chief-
taincy institution and other ‘non-state’ institutional 
actors have become in resource governance process-
es in post-colonial landscapes in building functional 
state authority. Hence, jettisoning or supplanting such 
revered ‘non-state’ institutions may rather impair the 
capacity of the state to render issues governable. For 
example, in the Kimminic project, chiefs had a proac-
tive role as they required Kimminic to employ many 
‘local citizens’ and protect their farmlands; this cre-
ated better livelihood impacts compared to the case 
of the ScanFuel project where state interventions to 
abruptly curtail ‘unbridled’ powers of chiefs rather 
complicated issues and resulted in livelihood destruc-
tion. Governing involves relating to others whether 
in coercive or persuasive forms. As evident from the 
above illustrations, the Ghanaian state has no alter-
native to governing without establishing reciprocal 
relations with multiple institutions (or institutional 
actors) across different spatial scales. 
This situation is not exclusive to jatropha biofuel pro-
jects but can also be observed in cases of other ter-
ritorial resources such as mining, forestry or marine 
which have also witnessed active involvement of 
chiefs in the allocation of concessions – in geologically 
prospective areas – in collaboration with state elites/
politicians. Decentralisation of resource management 
in Ghana’s artisanal and small-scale mining sector 
touted to ensure local participation and efficiency 
have rather worsened the complex, conflictual and 
clandestine nature of local resource politics in the 
sector due to the issue of institutional pluralism (see 
Hirons 2014; Adu-Baffour et al. 2021; Apoh et al. 2015). 
It is, therefore, recommended that facilitating frank 
political discussions between state institutions and 
customary authorities on resource-use debates and 
integrating the latter into the formal governance of 
small-scale mining would generate some legitimising 
effects, and consequently improve the resource gov-
ernance at the local level. The integration of civil so-
ciety organisations into the formal governance of the 
sector is encouraged as a way of giving local resource 
users a sense of due recognition, and hence improve 
the governance of the sector. In these situations, the 
state would not govern directly; but giving due recog-
nition to the relevant ‘non-state’ institutions (or insti-
tutional actors) as surrogates at the periphery grants 
the state a rather easier way to indirectly govern ter-
ritorial resources more effectively than supplanting 
such entities or abruptly curtailing their powers. 
That said, poor regulation of activities on the side of 
rapacious and powerful chiefs as well as activities of 
advocacy groups partly resulted in a number of prob-
lems. One example is when land allocation for the 
ScanFuel project was sanctioned by an experienced 
chief who also worked as a legal practitioner, and thus 
could not have claimed to be oblivious to the land 
use rights of indigenous families who suffered land 
dispossession without due compensation payments. 
The biofuel investor submitted itself to the regula-
tions introduced by the Ghana’s Lands Commission 
for proper scrutiny after the discovery of violations 
in the initial land allocation agreements reached with 
the chiefs. This presupposes that investors could have 
done things right if the chiefs had not abused their 
powers or ‘misled’ the management team of the com-
pany. Furthermore, the continuous split loyalty of the 
population between customary authorities and the 
state enables and constrains resource governance 
processes. Whereas it complements efforts of the 
state to govern territorial resources, it has provided 
the leeway for chiefs clutching at straws to enhance 
their authority and other parochial interests. As shown 
in the cases, the desire to ensure collective reverence 
for the chieftaincy institutions on land issues in-
formed the decision of chiefs to protect the land use 
rights of labour migrants who honoured regular pay-
ments of tributes as an expression of recognition of 
their landlords. Indigenous farmers who failed to do 
the same were labelled noncompliant by chiefs and 
suffered land dispossession as a result of the project 
implementation. Many native landowners could not 
convince the chiefs to respect their land use rights 
until orders from courts of law reversed decisions of 
the chiefs and warned chiefs to refrain from overstep-
ping permissible limits of their authority on local land 
administration (Boamah and Overå 2016). The incli-
nation of chiefs to reinvent custom for the purpose 
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of re-establishing and consolidating their authority 
over land complicated social relations, changed land 
property rights and re-defined local citizenship. In 
other words, chiefs took undue advantage of the situ-
ation to arrogate unto themselves the status of land-
owners rather than ‘trustees of land’ as required by 
customary laws in Ghana. In a similar vein, NGOs and 
community-based organisations served as alternative 
governance bodies by promoting transparency in the 
making of biofuel land deals as well as commitment to 
corporate social responsibilities in diverse advocacy 
platforms in and beyond Ghana. Yet, their desire to 
gain inordinate recognition and court public favours 
resulted in the distribution of misleading information 
which provoked needless public opposition to the bio-
fuel projects.
Apparently, per Western conceptions of what a strong 
state ought to be, chieftaincy institutions and advo-
cacy groups should be abolished or at best subject to 
substantial state control. Mann’s (1984) infrastructur-
al power approach suggests that state autonomy from 
civil society organisations is an essential condition for 
effective implementation of state visions throughout 
the territory the state claims to govern (ibid.). Over-
coming the complexities and obscurities characteris-
ing post-colonial political landscapes require critical 
reflections. A Eurocentric view of a ‘weak(ened)’ Afri-
can state authority due to the existence of near invin-
cible ‘non-state’ institutional actors in the governance 
process may, thus, fall short of explaining the nature 
of a functional state in ‘non-Western’ settings. ‘Failed’ 
or ‘weakened’ state framings often used to describe 
the limited capacity of African states to effectively im-
pose authority throughout the territory presuppose 
existence of something was hitherto strong or success-
ful but subsequently directed towards a certain dead 
end. Under such circumstances, state authority can-
not be considered ‘fragmented’ or ‘divided’ because 
such framings take for granted the relational dimen-
sion of power in the governance process or what has 
been constitutive of the state over years – even before 
the colonial era. The alternative is not unproblematic 
either. Chiefs and other actors involved in advocacy 
activities are forces to reckon with in political land-
scapes where the services they provide sometimes 
complement the functions and powers of the state. 
They are neither categorised as state institutional ac-
tors nor informal entities. They do not fit the defini-
tional scope of civil society organisations either. This 
is especially the case for the chieftaincy institution 
which provides legally binding interpretation of cus-
tom on matters relating to stool land. Hence, taking 
a middle ground stance in this dilemma requires nu-
ancing. 
We do not claim that relational governance offers uni-
versal remedy to the resource governance conun-
drums highlighted above. Rather, we think it provides 
a more promising analytic framework for critical en-
gagements with the merits as well as the limits and 
nature of cooperation between state and societal ac-
tors/institutions necessary for the effective govern-
ance of territorial resources in post-colonial political 
settings characterised by institutional pluralism. The 
relational governance approach also presents a heu-
ristic concept that overcomes the superficial sepa-
ration of formal and informal institutions, nuances 
Western and non-Western conceptions of charisma, 
and therefore foregrounds synergies between dif-
ferent actors and institutions that might otherwise 
be considered incompatible in Western contexts. Our 
approach may refresh the current debates on the gov-
ernance of territorial resources in post-colonial Af-
rican countries that have embraced democratic rule 
amid strong chieftaincy institutions and advocacy 
groups in governance processes. 
It is worth clarifying that the analytic framework we 
propose in this paper is intended neither to show af-
filiation to decoloniality, post-colonial or ‘post post-
colonial’ schools of thought nor to present an antith-
esis to Euro-/Western-centric epistemes. Rather our 
intention is to draw on relevant insights from these 
divergent perspectives in ways suited for engag-
ing fruitfully with recurrent governance dilemmas 
in contexts of institutional pluralism. This approach 
saves us from slipping into a utopian conceptualisa-
tion of state quality or ‘good governance’ and helps us 
to think anew in rather pragmatic terms. We believe, 
the relational governance approach, will stir up a re-
thinking and re-conceptualisation of terminologies 
such as formal, informal, non-state institutions (or ac-
tors). The statement “the capacity of the state actually 
to penetrate civil society (…)” used by Michael Mann 
(1984: 113) is a classic case of the West’s superficial 
separation of the ‘state’ from equally influential insti-
tutions in the society without interrogating, defining 
and clarifying conditions constitutive of the central 
state in non-Western political landscapes. The word 
“penetrate” presupposes dealing with entities that 
are radically different from the other and also rule out 
possible positive outcomes of their complementarity 
without – or with limited – frictions. In fact, Mann’s 
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definition of state infrastructural power confirms 
this directly or indirectly as it emphasises that state 
autonomy from civil society is the sine qua non for 
measuring state capacity. As explained earlier, gross 
application of these Western concepts in contexts 
of institutional pluralism becomes problematic and 
raises epistemological, ontological and methodologi-
cal issues. In natural resource governance studies, the 
distinction between formal and informal, state and 
non-state organisations and etc. becomes blurred. 
This highlights the reproduction and misapplication 
of concepts which are at odds with realities in post-co-
lonial Africa. An analytic framework that helps over-
come these crucial issues would advance the frontiers 
of resource governance studies. How can we know, 
understand, conceptualise, and study ‘non-state or-
ganisations’ and ‘state institutions’ in contexts of 
institutional pluralism? This is an important desi- 
deratum that should be challenged and approached by 
academics and practitioners equally in their specific 
epistemic pathways.
Notes 
1 These ideas have not only become institutionalised in 
textbooks, or scientific literature but have also featured in 
submissions by Western scholars during conference and 
seminar discussions on resource governance dilemmas in 
Africa. One such occasion involved the following question 
by a Scandinavian Professor after a conference presentati-
on on the role of Ghanaian chiefs in ‘land grabbing’ (Ber-
gen, Norway in 2015): ‘Would you agree that abandoning 
chieftaincy institutions could give African states a freehand 
in natural resource governance?’ No matter how weird this 
question may have sounded to the African audience in the 
conference, we see it neither as a naive nor mischievous 
submission. The question might have emerged out of frus-
trations with activities of the near invincible chiefs in re-
source governance and the difficulty to regulate the powers 
of societal organisations in relation to those of the central 
state, and therefore cannot be considered void.
2 Chiefs, clan/tribal leaders and their messengers constitute 
a traditional council which is headed by a paramount chief. 
Village chiefs act as messengers or representatives of para-
mount chiefs at the village level. 
3 These limitations of conventional theories of governance 
and heterarchy led to our decision of coupling governance 
with the concept of relationality. Indeed, here we see an in-
terplay at stake – to be able to understand and describe con-
temporary post-colonial settings in African nation states 
more concisely. Concerning the perspective of state-society 
relations, Joel Migdal (2001: 23) makes an argument similar 
to the one we want to draw here when we address relational 
governance: “Instead, the state-in-society approach points 
researchers to the process of interaction of groupings with 
one another and with that actual behavior they are vying 
to control or influence. (...). The dynamic process changes 
the groupings themselves, their goals, and ultimately, the 
rules they are promoting.” We want to name these changes 
intra-relational structures of interactions between stake-
holders.
4 The paper is based on an ethnographic study of biofuel in-
vestment projects in Ghana and a review of jatropha biofuel 
land deals between April 2012 and January 2013.
5 Land areas held in trust for a community or village by chiefs. 
Stools, as called in southern Ghana, or Skins, in northern 
Ghana, represent the seat of authority of chiefs.
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